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Abstract In addition to their core explanatory and predictive assumptions, scientific models 
include simplifying assumptions, which function as idealizations, approximations, and 
abstractions. There are methods to investigate whether simplifying assumptions bias the results of 
models, such as robustness analyses. However, the equally important issue – the focus of this 
paper – has received less attention, namely, what are the methodological and epistemic strengths 
and limitations associated with different simplifying assumptions. I concentrate on one type of 
simplifying assumption, the use of mega parameters as abstractions in ecological models. First, I 
argue that there are two kinds of mega parameters qua abstractions, sufficient parameters and 
aggregative parameters, which have gone unnoticed in the literature. The two are associated with 
different heuristics, holism and reductionism, which many view as incompatible. Second, I will 
provide a different analysis of abstractions and the associated heuristics than previous authors. 
Reductionism and holism and the accompanying abstractions have different methodological and 
epistemic functions, strengths, and limitations, and the heuristics should be viewed as providing 
complementary research perspectives of cognitively limited beings. This is then, third, used as a 
premise to argue for epistemic and methodological pluralism in theoretical ecology. Finally, the 
presented taxonomy of abstractions is used to comment on the current debate whether mechanistic 
accounts of explanation are compatible with the use of abstractions. This debate has suffered from 
an abstract discussion of abstractions. With a better taxonomy of abstractions the debate can be 
resolved.  
Key words: abstraction, aggregation, holism, mechanism, pluralism, reductionism, 





In addition to their core explanatory or predictive assumptions, models make use 
of simplifying assumptions, which function as idealizations, approximations, and 
abstractions. Simplifying assumptions make false, unrealistic, or inaccurate 
presumptions of target systems and/or core assumptions.1 
The function of simplifying assumptions is to facilitate the modeling and 
understanding of phenomena. However, the risk is that simplifying assumptions 
bias the results of models. Robustness analyses provide a method to investigate 
whether these “dubious details” affect the results of models (Levins 1966; 
Weisberg and Reisman 2008; Kuorikoski et al. 2010; Raerinne 2013b).  
Despite the fact that there are methods to investigate whether simplifying 
assumptions have effects on the results of models and despite extensive discussion 
on these methods, an equally important issue – the focus of this paper – has 
                                                          
1 Dividing modeling assumptions into core and simplifying assumptions is simplistic, but accurate 
enough for the purposes of this paper: I shall be concerned with one type of simplifying 
assumption only, the use of abstractions in models. Moreover, and due to the reason just 
mentioned, I shall not discuss how abstractions differ from other simplifying assumptions. This 
topic is beyond the scope of this paper.  For more fine-grained taxonomies of modeling 
assumptions, see Musgrave (1981), Mäki (2000), Weisberg and Reisman (2008), and Kuorikoski 
et al. (2010). 
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received less attention, namely, what are the methodological and epistemic 
strengths and limitations associated with different simplifying assumptions? Thus, 
rather than investigating whether simplifying assumptions have effects on the 
results of models simpliciter,  as in robustness analyses, I investigate how and 
under what conditions the simplifying assumptions are – or are not – useful.  
I focus on one variety of simplifying assumption, the use of parameters as 
abstractions in models. The parameters I discuss are called by different terms in 
the literature, such as macro, mega, gross-level, or summary parameters or 
variables. To avoid a plurality of terms, I will employ the term mega parameter.2 I 
argue that there are two kinds of mega parameters qua abstractions that are 
covered by the term: sufficient parameters and aggregative parameters. The two 
are associated with different heuristics, holism and reductionism, which many 
view as incompatible, such as being explanatory rivals, contrary, or even 
contradictory (see Levins 1998, 2006 and Winther 2006 below).  
Aggregation is accompanied by reductionistic research strategies (Wimsatt 
1986), whereas sufficient parameters are associated with holistic research 
strategies (Lane et al. 1976).  The two have different functions as abstractions and 
different sources of errors as well.  
In the case of a sufficient parameter, one is investigating whether different 
lower-level or finer-scale causes have similar or robust effects. If they have 
similar effects, then a modeler forms a sufficient parameter, which is used in 
models instead of different specific causes.  Sufficient parameters function as 
abstract, general, or higher-level causal or explanatory surrogates for different 
lower-level or finer-scale causes or mechanisms that have robust or similar effects 
in models of a common phenomenon.  If a result is robust, the job of identifying 
the actual cause or mechanism can be irrelevant for some modeling purposes. The 
examples of sufficient parameters discussed in this paper include resources and 
environmental heterogeneity (see section 2).  
  In aggregation, one is integrating different lower-level or finer-scale causal 
components with different or similar effects to extrapolate what their combined 
effect would be. A modeler forms a parameter, which combines the effects of 
different causal components into a single monadic coarse scale component, the 
aggregative parameter, which involves abstracting away the details of the 
organization of the system. The aggregative parameter is then used in a model as a 
causal or explanatory surrogate for the different causal components and their 
organization abstracted away in the parameter.  The example of an aggregative 
parameter discussed in this paper is the total predation response (see section 3). 
Levins (1998, 2006) and Winther (2006) view different research heuristics 
as contradictory and their synthesis as the true or correct perspective. I will 
provide a different analysis of abstractions and the associated heuristics. My 
argument for the complementarity of different abstractions and heuristics is 
epistemic and methodological. Another difference between my paper and previous 
authors is that the authors have failed to distinguish between sufficient and 
aggregate parameters, which are different as abstractions.  
                                                          
2 Many examples of mega parameters are variables (e.g. the total predation response in section 3). 
It is the difference between different simplifying assumptions qua abstractions, rather than the 
difference between parameters and variables, that is important in this context. However, the 
discussion of abstractions is historically connected to parameters by Levins and later authors, so I 
use this term even in the case of variables to avoid unnecessary terminological complications. 
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I use reductionism to refer to the call for mechanistic models and 
explanations for ecological phenomena rather than the call for Nagelian theory 
reduction of ecology to more basic sciences. This is how ecologists understand the 
difference between holism and reductionism as modeling heuristics.3  Note that 
the two have different goals. Nagelian theory reduction amounts to explaining the 
higher-level laws and phenomena in terms of lower-level laws, but not to 
epistemic or methodological elimination of higher-level laws, theories, or 
phenomena. However, mechanistic reductionism in its extreme form (e.g. 
“ecological systems are nothing but mere aggregates”) would amount to epistemic 
and methodological elimination in and of ecology. That is, it would amount to the 
replacement, not reduction, of ecological theories. I am not aware of an author 
who has explicitly defended an extreme version of mechanistic reductionism in 
ecology.  Schoener (1986) comes close to it, even though he erroneously thinks of 
himself as defending Nagelian theory reduction in ecology (see section 3). 
I shall be concerned with models that are used to generate explanations and 
predictions (see Odenbaugh 2005 for other functions of ecological models). There 
is a current debate whether – and/or to what extent – mechanistic accounts of 
explanation are compatible with the use of abstraction, that is, whether 
mechanistic accounts are committed to the thesis that de-abstracting or adding 
more details to an explanation always or typically makes the explanation better 
(see Machamer et al. 2000, 15-18; Kaplan 2011, 347-348; Levy and Bechtel 2013; 
Boone and Piccini 2016, 1517-1519; and Miłkowski 2016). This debate has 
suffered from an abstract discussion of abstractions. As I will show, there are 
different kinds of abstractions, which are utilized by both holists and 
reductionists. With a functional taxonomy of abstractions, the debate can thus be 
resolved. Both adding certain kinds of details (i.e. de-abstracting) and omitting 
certain other kinds of details (i.e. abstracting) can improve mechanistic 
explanations. 
In sections 2 and 3, I discuss methodological functions, strengths, and 
limitations associated with sufficient and aggregative parameters. In section 4, I 
argue for epistemic and methodological pluralism in theoretical ecology. 
Mechanistic and holistic models can both be true of a common phenomenon and 
be complementary, but have different epistemic strengths and limitations. 
Moreover, even if they applied to different phenomena, reductionism and holism 
can nevertheless be viewed as complementary. The two have different 
methodological strengths and limitations; and we often need another modeling 
heuristic to see the limitations of our own heuristic. Previous accounts viewing 
different heuristics as incompatible perspectives, such as Levins’ (1998, 2006) 
and Winther’s (2006), seem to lack resources to argue for the above kind of 
pluralisms, despite what the authors suggest.  
A case study of this paper is concerned with predation and the case is 
connected to two mega parameters discussed in the paper, namely, resources and 
total predation response. Other cases concerning mega parameters include 
competition theory and its mega parameters, such as competition coefficients, 
Tilman’s R*, and environmental heterogeneity; selection, drift, speciation, and 
dispersal (Vellend 2010); the selection coefficient in population genetics and 
fitness (Cohen 1985); and body size in allometries and scaling laws. I have 
                                                          
3 Some notable defenders of holistic models in ecology include MacArthur, Lotka, Volterra, May, 
and Levins. Some notable defenders of reductionistic models in ecology include Schoener, Tilman, 
and Grimm.  
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examined some of the latter cases of mega parameters elsewhere (Raerinne 2013a; 
Raerinne and Baedke 2015).  
 
 
2 Holism and Sufficient Parameters 
 
Robustness analysis is a search for similar or convergent results of different 
models of a common phenomenon (Levins 1966; Weisberg and Reisman 2008; 
Kuorikoski et al. 2010; Raerinne 2013b).  In robustness analysis, the results of a 
model are compared with the results of different models of the same phenomenon. 
If the model and its contrasts produce similar or convergent results, then we have 
a robust result. 
One problem in ecology is that there are different causes or mechanisms 
(C1, C2, and C3) at lower levels or finer scales that have similar or convergent 
results (Es) and we do not know which of them is the actual cause or mechanism 
of a phenomenon. An advantage of having robust results of models that model 
different causes with similar effects is that their robustness counts as a warrant to 
use unifying, abstract, and simple models of complex phenomena. In lieu of 
building a model for every case where different causes or mechanisms could be at 
work, a modeler builds a model that is simple and abstract but robust in capturing 
the common effects of models. One way to build such models is by constructing a 
sufficient parameter into a model (Levins 1966; Lane et al. 1976). 
Levins (1966, 429) clarified sufficient parameters as follows:  
 
The sufficient parameters may arise from the combination of results of more 
limited studies. In our robust theorem on niche breadth [i.e. “in an uncertain 
environment species will evolve broad niches and tend toward 
polymorphism but a certain and diverse environment leads to 
specializations”] we found that temporal variation, patchiness of the 
environment, productivity of the habitat, and mode of hunting could all have 
similar effects, and they did this by way of their contribution to the 
uncertainty of the environment. Thus uncertainty emerges as a sufficient 
parameter. 
The sufficient parameter is a many-to-one transformation of lower-
level phenomena. Therein lies its power and utility, but also a new source of 
imprecision. The many-to-one nature of “uncertainty” prevents us from 
going backward. If either temporal variation or patchiness or low 
productivity leads to uncertainty, the consequences of uncertainty alone 
cannot tell us whether the environment is variable or patchy or 
unproductive. Therefore we have lost information. [Emphasis added.] 
 
 
Wimsatt (1980, 304-305) developed the idea from a similar angle:  
 
A sufficient parameter is thus an index which, either for most purposes, or 
merely for the purposes at hand, captures the effect of variations in the 
lower level variables (usually only for certain ranges of the values of these 
variables) and can thus be substituted for them in the attempt to build 
simpler models of the upper level phenomena. It is related to the notion of a 
supervenient property widely discussed in the recent philosophical 
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literature… except that whereas the latter involves a deductive and therefore 
exact relation between lower and upper level properties, the notion of a 
sufficient parameter is broader, involving a relation which is inexact, 
approximate and usually conditional. A sufficient parameter is a heuristic 
tool for dealing with complexity... The notion of supervenience … may be 
regarded as a kind of limiting case of a sufficient parameter, but it is I would 
argue, a relation which is seldom is ever found in the models of the science. 
Sufficient parameters, however, are frequent tools of scientists. 4 
 
 
In the case of a holistic sufficient parameter one is thus investigating whether 
different lower-level or finer-scale causes (C1, C2, or C3), have similar effects (Es). 
If they have similar effects, then a modeler builds a causal or explanatory proxy 
(Cabs) that abstracts away the differences between alternative or back-up causes 
(C1, C2, or C3) with similar effects (Es). This abstract sufficient parameter (Cabs) 
with similar effects (Es) is then used in models and equations instead of different 
specific causes (C1, C2, or C3). In other words, lower-level or finer-scale causes 
(C1→Es), (C2→Es), and (C3→Es) are replaced with an abstract causal proxy 
(Cabs→Es) in a holistic model.  Sufficient parameters function as abstract or 
higher-level causal or explanatory surrogates for different lower-level or finer-
scale causes or mechanisms that have similar effects in models of a phenomenon.   
One problem in using sufficient parameters is that causes have similar, but 
not identical, effects, and this information is lost when using the causal proxy 
(Cabs→Es).  At the same time, the abstract and higher-level relationship (Cabs→ Es) 
is stable and unifying in the sense that it does not matter which of the individual 
causes is present (C1, C2, or C3), since a similar effect (Es) will follow in different 
background conditions (back-up causes), with regard to different systems 
(different operative causes), and so on.  
An example of a sufficient parameter is environmental uncertainty in 
Levins’ (1966) robust theorem concerning niche breadth. There are different 
instances of environmental uncertainty, such as temporal variation of the 
environment (C1) and patchiness of the environment (C2), which have similar 
effects on species, namely, species tend to evolve broad niches and tend toward 
polymorphism (Es). The robustness of the results of different instances of 
uncertainty of environment in different models allows the use of environmental 
uncertainty (Cabs) as a sufficient parameter in an abstract model of this 
phenomenon.  Levins (1966) establishes this  with three models, which make 
                                                          
4 It is an interesting research topic what the connection between sufficient parameters and different 
concepts of supervience is, e.g. what is the minimum concept of supervenience (or emergency) 
that is presumed by sufficient parameters? This topic needs to be investigated elsewhere,  since it 
is beyond the scope of this paper. At the same time, this topic is less relevant to the topics of the 
paper than might at first appear. First, it is not constitutive determination relations, such as 
supervenience or emergence (for the difference and connection between the two, see Kim 2006), 
which are typically conceived of as synchronic relations that are important in the given context, 
but causal and mechanistic relations, which involve synchronic, diachronic, and intensional 
relations. Second, and related to the first point, sufficient parameters are not introduced or used as 
a metaphysical determination relation by scientists, but sufficient parameters are explanatory and 
predictive tools of scientists to deal with complex systems, which is Wimsatt’s point in the passage 
quoted above (see also my discussion in section 4). Third, reference to supervenience in this 
context might not be helpful, since this relation is used in diverse ways in the literature and, more 
importantly, there are qualms about the usefulness of supervenience as a metaphysical 
determination relation (see Horgan 1993).     
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different assumptions concerning species, their fitness, genetics, and so on. Since 
the three models have the common result referred to, this justifies using 
environmental uncertainty as a sufficient parameter in a holistic or general model 
of this phenomenon.  
A model with a sufficient parameter shows how different modeled causes or 
mechanisms that have similar results can be presented in a unifying theoretical 
framework (Cabs→Es) which abstracts away the differences between causes or 
mechanisms. If a result is robust, the job of identifying the actual cause or 
mechanism (C1, C2, or C3) can be irrelevant for some modeling purposes.  
Unification by means of sufficient parameters is a beneficial feature of 
model-based explanations and predictions. Unification provides us with 
conceptual and cognitive economy, coherence, and systematization of knowledge. 
However, nothing in the above presupposes that for explanations the identification 
of the actual cause or mechanism has become redundant, owing to the robustness 
of the results of models. It is here where “lies its power and utility, but also a new 
source of imprecision,” as Levins expressed the dual nature of sufficient 
parameters in the passage quoted above.  
The above imprecision concerning the actual causes and mechanisms of a 
phenomenon in using sufficient parameters is one of the main motivations behind 
mechanistic or reductionist models in the literature (Tilman 1977, 1980, 1990; 
Schoener 1986). The defenders of mechanistic models want to expose the actual 
causes and mechanisms behind phenomena. Another reason is that mechanistic 
models can sometimes be used to provide more accurate predictions and 
explanations than holistic models of the same phenomenon with sufficient 
parameters.  
For a holist, a resource is valid as a sufficient parameter (Cabs), because 
resources have similar effects on population growth rates (Es): “[a] resource is a 
factor which, through some range of availabilities, leads to higher population 
growth rates as its availability is increased and which is consumed, in the broad 
sense, by the population” (Tilman 1977, 363).5 However, Tilman (1980, 1986) has 
shown that the abstraction can be unpacked into distinct and more detailed causal 
factors (C1, C2, ...). Different resources have the similar general effect (Es) 
mentioned in that they have a positive effect on the population growth rates when 
there is a certain amount of a resource to be consumed. At the same time, different 
                                                          
5 As noted by an anonymous referee, the above definition of resources – which was meant to apply 
to ecology only – was taken from Tilman. I do not see any contradiction in the fact that Tilman is 
not a holist, but a reductionist, and that his definition can be used as a sufficient parameter of 
resources by holists. In fact, Tilman needs a working definition of abstract resources if he wants to 
de-abstract this definition with his mechanistic taxonomy of resources (see below). Furthermore, 
this mechanistic taxonomy of resources, as I argue later on, can be used by holists as well to see 
when their abstract definition of resources as a sufficient parameter is not valid. The main thesis of 
this paper is that holism and reductionism are not contradictory but complementary as heuristics. If 
the reader is dissatisfied with this abrupt discussion of resources, as the anonymous referee was, let 
me motivate the discussion. First, there probably are not many other concepts in ecology that are 
theoretically more important than resources. Even most definitions of niche presume a definition 
of resources, especially the Hutchinsonian concept; and consequently, resources are a central 
concept in the context of competition theory as well. Second, other definitions of resources do 
exist in the literature, but Tilman’s mechanistic taxonomy of resources is currently among the best 
and most workable of definitions, even though it includes missing items and perhaps even 
inconsistencies. Finally, I utilize Tilman’s mechanistic taxonomy of resources – his de-abstraction 
of a sufficient parameter – in section 3 to show how an abstraction by reductionists can also 
founder (see the total predation response in section 3).  
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resources (C1, C2, ...) have different kinds of specific effects on population growth 
rates as well, which, in turn, have different effects on the outcome of interspecific 
competition (see below) and consumer-resource interactions (see total predation 
response in section 3).  
Tilman (1980, 1986) has provided us with a mechanistic taxonomy of 
resources, which de-abstracts the abstract sufficient parameter used by holists. 
What follows is my paraphrasing of Tilman’s mechanistic taxonomy of resources. 
Readers interested in original definitions should consult Tilman’s papers.  Let (C1) 
and (C2) stand for two different resources. There are three main types of 
resources: essential, substitutable, and hemi-essential resources.  Resources are 
essential when both (C1) and (C2) are required for the growth of a population, that 
is, (C1) and (C2) are necessary, but neither (C1) nor (C2) alone is sufficient for 
growth. In the case of substitutable resources, (C1) and (C2) are sufficient, but 
neither (C1) nor (C2) is necessary for growth; that is, either (C1) or (C2) is needed 
for growth. Finally, in the case of hemi-essential resources, (C1) alone can be both 
necessary and sufficient for growth, but (C2) can at least partly substitute for (C1).   
For the purposes of this paper, the more interesting cases are the different 
kinds of resources falling under the rubric of substitutable resources, namely, 
perfectly substitutable, complementary, antagonist, and switching resources (see 
below and  discussion in sections 3 and 4). (C1) and (C2) are perfectly 
substitutable resources if (C1) can be substituted for (C2) and vice versa. (C1) and 
(C2) are complementary resources in the case of positive emergence: when (C1) 
and (C2) are consumed together, their combined effect on growth is greater than 
what the additive sum of (C1) and (C2) would suggest when (C1) and (C2) are not 
consumed together. (C1) and (C2) are antagonist resources in the case of negative 
emergence: when (C1) and (C2) are consumed together, their combined effect on 
growth is smaller than what the additive sum of (C1) and (C2) would suggest when 
(C1) and (C2) are not consumed together. (C1) and (C2) are switching resources 
when organisms can switch between (C1) and (C2) when (C1) or (C2) has a more 
positive effect on the growth. When providing more accurate and specific 
predictions, the differences between the mentioned resources matter, for instance, 
in the context of competition between species for limited resources.  
In a homogeneous environment, a necessary condition for the stable co-
existence of two species with similar niches competing for two essential limiting 
resources is that each species consumes relatively more of the resource that is 
most limiting to its own growth, i.e. species should be competitively dominant 
vis-à-vis the resource that is the most limiting to the species.  However, this is not 
a necessary condition for the coexistence of competitor species for other types of 
resources, such as substitutable or hemi-essential resources (Tilman 1980). In a 
spatially heterogeneous environment, there is no simple limit to the number of 
coexisting species competing for two (hemi-)essential resources, whereas the 
number of coexisting species competing for switching or antagonist resources 
cannot exceed the number of their limiting resources (Tilman 1986).  We thus get 
more system-specific, accurate, and testable predictions and explanations from 
models when the abstraction, such as resource (Cabs), is de-abstracted or reified 
into distinct and detailed causal factors (C1, C2, or C3).  
However, the moral is not that holists are sloppier in explanations (or 
predictions) than reductionists or mechanists. For a holist, similarity rather than 
identity of effects of different causes is enough to justify the abstraction, because 
they aim at general and unifying explanations, whereas mechanistic modelers aim 
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at more fine-grained or precise explanations that are system specific. The 
difference is between favoring different kinds of dimensions of explanatory power 
(see section 4). 
Mechanistic models thus have advantages over holistic models in being able 
to produce more exact and testable explanations and predictions. The other side of 
the coin is that mechanistic models lose generalizability in that the class of 
phenomena with which they are concerned may be limited, i.e. they become case 
studies of narrow scope. Moreover, when modeling a phenomena with lower-level 
causal components or finer-scale details, the models tend to become complex, 
intractable, involve many functional and interacting components with a large 
number of parameters, are hard to comprehend, and so on. To avoid these pitfalls, 




3 Reductionism and Aggregative Parameters 
 
In aggregation, one integrates or merges different lower-level or finer-scale causal 
components with different or similar effects to extrapolate what their combined 
effect would be. To do so, a modeler forms a parameter, which combines the 
effects of different causal components into a single monadic coarse scale 
component, the aggregative parameter, which involves abstracting away the 
details of the organization of the system.  In other words, with an aggregative 
parameter one builds a composite abstraction of different causal components (Ci)  
with different or similar effects (Ei),  using a function that combines the effects of 
different components together into one causal proxy (C1+n) which has a compound 
effect (E1+n). An aggregative and abstract function or relation (C1+n→E1+n) is then 
used in mechanistic models. Given that different components or forces are 
typically responsible for the system-level properties in ecology, many would 
welcome a synthesis of ecology by means of aggregative parameters (cf. Schoener 
1986 and Vellend 2010).  
There are general problems with aggregation. Different individual causal 
components (Ci), might fail to be operative in different background conditions. 
Thus, their combination (C1+n) is not stable or projectable if the background 
conditions change. Addition of components and their subtraction typically have 
the result that a qualitatively different compound effect than (E1+n) is produced. 
The organization of how components are put together affects the system behavior.  
That is, the organization of components matter, and changes in organization can 
produce emergent effects. In general, rearrange, substitute, add, or subtract some 
of the individual components (Ci) and the compound effect (E1+n) might be 
qualitatively different (for more detailed cases, see below and Wimsatt 1986).  
There have been heated debates as to what kind of heuristics ecological 
modelers should favor. These debates are related to the issue of what kinds of 
abstractions ecologists should use in their models. In his defense of mechanistic or 
reductionistic ecological models over and above traditional holistic models, 
Schoener suggests that a strong form of mechanistic reductionism holds in 
ecology; namely, that the higher-level properties of ecological systems are 




The phenomena of interest in population ecology are aggregate properties of 
the individuals composing the population; examples are age structure, sex 
ratios, growth rates, and reproductive schedules. Community ecology deals 
with a group of populations in some place. Here the aggregate properties of 
interest concern the various species populations: abundance distributions, 
species diversity, species-turnover rates, and so on. (Schoener 1986, 91.) 
 
 
As a general or unqualified thesis, Schoener’s claim that the properties of 
ecological systems are aggregates of their components’ properties in isolation is 
implausible. In fact, as a general empirical claim it is false. Consider predation, 
which is a causal factor that has an effect on prey mortality and population density 
– a positive causal mortality factor of prey and thus a negative (regulatory) causal 
factor of prey’s population density.  Predation is an abstraction of the components 
of predator-prey systems.6  
Holling (1959) is a classical study on predation focusing not only on the 
components of predation, but on how the components make up and interact to 
produce a total predation response. The total predation response expresses the 
total proportion of mortality rate of prey by its predators, determining whether the 
                                                          
6 How can I claim that predation is both a causal factor and an abstraction? I thank an anonymous 
referee for pointing out this issue to me. As has been argued by Reisman and Forber (2005), 
higher-level abstract variables can be regarded as causes in the sense of being difference-makers to 
their effects. Even though their arguments concern natural selection and drift as abstract 
population-level causes, the arguments can be applied to predation. In fact, the basic idea behind 
Holling’s (1959) predation study (see below) is to investigate how the total predation response, as 
a higher- or population-level cause, affects the densities of prey populations, what are the 
components of this abstract cause, and how the components interact to produce the population-
level cause. Another classical study in this context is Paine (1966). Paine was interested in how 
observed high local diversities of many communities are compatible with the competitive 
exclusion principle rather than being exceptions to it. His study and other studies that followed 
afterwards by him and others manipulated predation and investigated what effects different levels 
of predation – as a  population- or community-level cause – has on the diversity of communities 
and population densities of competitor species in communities.  Paine and others discovered 
experimentally that removing one or more of the top predator species from their communities had 
the effect of reducing the alpha diversity of communities’ consumer species: without a common 
predator species, a few (and perhaps even one) competitively dominant consumer species come to 
monopolize the community by outcompeting other consumer species. Paine’s explanation was that 
predators can mediate the coexistence of their prey and maintain the local diversity of a 
community at a high level by keeping competing prey populations’ densities or abundances below 
a level at which the competition would become so severe as to cause local extinctions of species 
from the community. The story about predation as an abstract cause does not end here, but gets 
even more abstract. These and similar experimental findings and explanations of exceptions to the 
competitive exclusion principle were later generalized as the intermediate disturbance rule. 
According to this rule, intermediate levels of abiotic or biotic disturbances, such as predation, 
pathogens, aridity, storms, and fires are capable of mediating the coexistence of competitor species 
and thus maintaining the local diversity of a community at a relatively high level. Different 
instances of intermediate disturbances have the same or a similar effect, for instance, through 
reduction of population densities of competitor species, which counter the strong competitive 
effects between species. (Too small or too infrequent disturbances lead to local extinctions of 
competitively inferior species by competitively dominant ones, whereas too intense or too frequent 
disturbances allow for the few species that are the most stress-tolerant to exclude other species 
from a community.) Note that, in the above rule, “intermediate disturbance” works as an abstract 
causal factor, a sufficient parameter, of which predation is one instance. In sum, abstract causes – 
aggregative and sufficient parameters – can be treated and are treated by ecologists as causes in the 
sense of being difference-makers to their effects.  
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density of prey population is regulated by its predators. The shape of the total 
predation response curve helps to determine whether the predators are able to 
control their prey population density.  Expressed in the terminology of this paper, 
Holling’s idea was to study whether the total predation response is an aggregative 
property of its components’ properties in isolation and how the total predation 
response, as a biotic density-dependent factor, regulates the density of prey 
species populations.  
Holling’s study originally started as a field investigation of a simple 
predator-prey system in a uniform and homogenous environment, which was 
causally isolated from abiotic and biotic background conditions that could 
interfere with the system. The ingenuity of Holling’s study was that he stripped 
down this simple predator-prey system into its basic components to see how the 
components produced the supposedly aggregate property of the system, namely, 
the total predation response.  Later, he started to investigate the basic components 
of predation in the laboratory using other systems. His investigations showed that 
the total predation response is more than the sum of the properties of predator-
prey systems’ components’ properties in isolation, i.e. an emergent rather than a 
simple aggregate property. The results of his investigations apply to predator-prey 
systems in general. In fact, later studies on predation have elucidated different 
ways in which the total predation response is not an aggregative property of 
predator-prey systems in general.  I will paraphrase the results of Holling’s study 
using the terminology of this paper.  
Holling’s (1959) study was originally concerned with the predation of 
cocoons of a sawfly species by three mammal species. Due to the simplicity of the 
predator-prey system and the uniformity of the background conditions, there 
initially seemed to be two main additive components to the total predation 
response: 1) how predators respond dietarily to changes in their prey density, such 
as by consuming their prey in fewer or greater numbers  (the so-called functional 
response of predators) and 2) how predator density is affected by the density of 
their prey (the so-called numerical response of predators).  A functional response 
(C1) is the change in predator’s consumption as a function of change in prey 
density, whereas a numerical response (C2) is the change in predator density as a 
function of change in prey density. The total predation response is a combination 
of functional and numerical responses. Were the total predation response an 
aggregative property of predator-prey systems, then the effects (E1) and (E2) of 
predators’ numerical (C1) and functional (C2) responses on the mortality of their 
prey could be combined as independent (additive) elements, and the aggregative 
function (C1+2→E1+2) could be applied to predator-prey systems to model total 
predation responses. 
However, as Holling notices, prey density has different kinds of effects on 
the functional response of predators. There is no typical or general response, 
although some qualitative general results can be stated, cf. the classical type I, II, 
and III functional response curves in Box 1. The numerical response is more 
varied, and there are species that show no numerical response, whereas other 
species show a marked positive or even negative7  numerical response vis-à-vis 
changes in the density of their prey. The total predation response is thus a 
                                                          
7 Tilman’s mechanistic or reductionistic taxonomy of resources contains missing items (see section 
2). An example is resources that under certain conditions – as individual causal factors – can have 




combination of two possible continua: “a negative numerical response to a marked 
positive numerical response” and “no functional response to a marked positive 
effect in functional response.” Thus, there is no general or universal total 
predation response, because the components vary and/or are taxon or system 
specific.8  
Consider a simple case where there is no numerical response in predators, 
but predators respond only functionally to changes in the density of their prey; 
predator species with longer generation times than their prey fit this assumption at 
least approximately. In this case, the total predation response curve is determined 
by the functional response curve of predators (see Fig. 2 in Box 1), and 
consequently the prey mortality rate is determined by the functional response of 
predators. With a linear, type I functional response curve, the mortality rate of 
prey is constant and the prey population density is regulated by its predator, which 
is thought to lead to classical Lotka-Volterra population dynamics in the predator-
prey system, where there are cyclic and coupled changes in both predator and prey 
population densities.9  With a rectangular hyperbola, type II functional response 
curve, the prey mortality rate declines with increases in prey density: predators are 
able to regulate their prey population density at low prey densities, but the death 
rate of prey due to predation starts to diminish at moderate prey densities, and the 
prey population is even capable of escaping the checks of its “natural enemies” at 
high population densities. With an S-shaped, type III functional response curve, 
the mortality rate of prey due to predation is low at its low density, then it starts to 
accelerate at moderate prey densities, because the  functional response of 
predators accelerates with the changes in their prey density, and finally the 
mortality rate of prey starts to diminish and even plateaus at high prey density, 
showing that there is little or no regulation of prey population density by its 
predators at low and high prey density, even though the prey population density 
may be regulated by predators at moderate prey population densities.  
What is more, the total predation response is typically affected by many 
other components of the predator-prey system and its background conditions than 
functional and numerical responses, which can have various and even opposing 
effects on total predation, on the two mentioned basic components, on the 
interactions between the components, and so on. As examples of additional 
                                                          
8 The above does not yet necessarily establish that the total predation response is not an 
aggregative property. This is because the total predation response could be an aggregative property 
of a system’s specific functional and numerical responses, even though the details of aggregation 
vary from one system to another. In a certain predator-prey system, the total predation response 
could be an aggregative property of a numerical response curve 1 in Figure 1 and a functional 
response curve 4 in Figure 2. In this case, the total predation response curve would have the form 
of a curve 5 in Figure 3. In another system, the total predation curve could be an aggregative 
property of a numerical response curve 2 in Figure 1, and a functional response curve 4 in Figure 
2. In the latter case, the total predation response curve would have the form of a curve 6 in Figure 
3. In both cases, the total predation response would thus be an aggregative property of each 
system’s components’ properties in isolation. This would be an empty victory for reductionists, 
however. Aggregations would lack generality and extrapolability.  
9 There is an ongoing debate whether different versions of Lotka-Volterra predator-prey models 
produce robust results (e.g. Weisberg and Reisman 2008). The main issue is whether the results of 
Lotka-Volterra models are affected by the simplifying assumptions used in the models. This 
debate has its own merits. However, if the core assumption of this model itself – the idea that the 
functional response curve of predators is or approximates type I curve – is a bad representation of 
most predator-prey systems (and it often is), robustness analyses of these models cannot establish 
that they are good models. 
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components, consider the availability and quality of alternative resources for 
predators, the degree of resource specialization of predators, immigration and 
emigration of predators and prey, the traits of prey species, such as their 
palatability or defense mechanisms, and competition between predator species for 
resources (Holling 1959, 305-308; Korpimäki and Norrhdahl 1989; and Persson 
and Diehl 1990).  To have a total predation response, the effects of the additional 
components need to be considered on the already existing components and/or 
added to the total predation response. The effects that these other components 
have on the already mentioned two response functions need not be uniform, nor 
are these other components uniform in effects in different background conditions, 
taxa, community structures, etc. That is, the total predation response is not an 
aggregative property of predator-prey systems in general.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
The nature of alternative resources matter. Alternative perfectly 
substitutable resources for predators can negatively affect their functional 
response, but positively affect their numerical response, whereas antagonistic 
resources can have negative effects on both functional and numerical responses. 
Essential, complementary, and switching types of alternative resources have 
different kinds of effects – positive, negative, or none – on the numerical and/or 
functional response of predators.  The additional components are thus capable of 
interacting in qualitatively different ways with the basic components and/or are 
capable of having qualitatively different effects on the total predation response, 
the way the components interact with each other, and so on.   
As predation increases, prey can respond to this in various ways, such as 
producing chemicals that make the prey less palatable or organizing to defend 
themselves. This can have a negative effect on the functional response of 
predators, it can have an effect on the way in which alternative resources are 
consumed by predators, which in turn can have negative or positive effects on the 
numerical or functional response of predators. And there are higher-order 
interactions between different components that need to be considered, such as the 
effects of competition between predator species for their prey, the predators of 
predators, which are capable of producing positive and negative causal feed-back 
loops affecting the system and its components in various and qualitatively diverse 
ways.  
The upshot is that the total predation response is typically not an 
aggregative property of its components’ properties in isolation, but an emergent 
property of a predator-prey system. The way the components interact, how they 
are organized, what are the biotic and abiotic background conditions, and so on, 
do matter and produce qualitative different or emergent total predation response 
curves (see Box 1). Total predation is mechanistically explainable, but it is more 
than the sum of its components’ properties in isolation. Other cases of non-
aggregate properties include, for instance, fitness (Cohen 1985), Tilman’s 
complementary and antagonistic resources (see section 2), and Vellend’s (2010) 
selection, drift, speciation, and dispersal. Many and perhaps even most of the 
higher-level properties of systems in ecology cannot be treated or modeled as 
mere aggregates of their components’ properties in isolation, in contrast to what 
seems to be suggested by Schoener (1986) in the passage quoted above.  
What was said about problems of treating the properties of ecological 
systems as aggregates was not aimed to show that aggregation is futile. Nor was 
the above presented as an argument against reductionism as a heuristic. 
Aggregation is an effective method to make complex mechanistic or reductionist 
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models simpler, more mathematically or analytically tractable, less sensitive to 
parametric variation in results, less prone to the parameter value estimation 
problems, and so on (Levin 1991, 1992). Aggregation is an effective strategy for 
abstracting with regard to simple systems and their properties in homogenous or 
constant environments. Approximations and partial aggregations sometimes 
suffice (Iwasa et al. 1987; Iwasa et al. 1989). Aggregation errors can be corrected 
and different methods are discussed in the literature (Gardner et al. 1982; Rastetter 
et al. 1992). Carelessly treating or naively assuming, however, in the sense of 
Schoener (1986) and perhaps Vellend (2010),  that the higher-level properties of 
ecological systems are mere aggregates of their components’ properties in 
isolation can lead to simplification errors and biases in results, non-projectable 
results, and unjustified policy- and decision-making recommendations.   
Finally, the above discussion in this and the previous section on two kinds 
of abstractions utilized by holists and reductionists shows that mechanists are not 
committed to the unqualified thesis that adding details, i.e. de-abstracting, always 
or typically improves their explanations (see discussion in Machamer et al. 2000, 
15-18; Kaplan 2011, 347-348; Levy and Bechtel 2013; Boone and Piccini 2016, 
1517-1519; and Miłkowski 2016 on this topic). Mechanists use abstractions to 
make better model-based explanations and predictions, it is just that the 
abstractions utilized are different from those used by holists. Both adding certain 
kinds of details, such as de-abstracting a sufficient parameter and omitting certain 
other kinds of details, such as utilizing an abstract aggregative parameter, can 
improve a mechanistic model without necessarily jeopardizing the basic tenet of 















































































Fig. 2. Functional response 
curves: predator consumption (y 
axis) vs. prey density (x axis)  
Fig. 1. Numerical response 
curves: predator density (y 
axis) vs. prey density (x axis)  
Fig. 3. Total predation response 
curves: total predation (y axis) vs.  




Box 1. Numerical, functional, and total predation curves (partly adopted from Holling 1959).  
 
Fig. 1. Curve 1: a positive numerical response. Curve 2: no numerical response. Curve 3: a 
negative numerical response. Fig. 2. Curve 4: a positive functional response, the so-called 
Type II functional response, which has the form of a rectangular hyperbola.  Type I and III 
curves are represented as dashed curves. Fig. 3. Curve 5: the total predation response:  curves 
1+4. Curve 6: the total predation response: curves 2+4. Curve 7: the total predation response: 
curves 3+4. Even in the simple case presented here, where there is only one type of functional 
response, Type II, which is added to three different numerical response curves, shows that 
there is no general total predation response curve, but quantitatively (curves 5 and 6) and 
qualitatively (curve 7) different kinds of curves do exist. The case is more complex when one 
adds different functional response curves to three basic numerical response curves (dashed 
curves in Fig. 2, which represent the so-called Type I (linear) and Type III (S shaped) 
functional curves):  qualitatively very different kinds of total predation response curves than 5, 
6, and 7 follow. Note that the total predation response is presented in Fig. 3 as an additive or 
aggregative of numerical and functional response curves. Actually, this is not necessarily the 
case, but numerical and functional response can interact in emergent ways. However, let us 
suppose that the total predation response is additive of the two components. Now, add the 
effects of other components of total predation, such as availability of alternative resources, to 
the functional or numerical response component and/or to total predation. These can affect 
both numerical and functional response curves in various and even opposite ways. For 
instance, numerical responses can be made more positive or negative, functional responses can 
become more positively pronounced, and so on. The effect that alternative resources have on 
total predation response curves can be very varied, and qualitatively very different curves than 
curves 5-7 follow. Similarly, competition between predators for resources can have different 
effects on the numerical or functional response or on the total predation response, and so on. 
That is, there are direct and indirect interactions between the components of the total predation 
response curve that have varied and emergent effects on the form of the total predation 
response, on the components of the curve, how the components interact, and so on – cf. the 
dashed total predation response curve in Fig. 3, which presents a hypothetical curve of how 
different components could “add up” to form a complex and non-aggregative total predation 
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4 Model Pluralism and Complementarity of Heuristics  
 
In ecology, the strategy of using a diverse set of holistic and reductionistic models 
to gain understanding of a common phenomenon, such as competition or 
predation, is typical (Levins 1966; Levin 1991, 1992). This diversity of models 
for one and the same phenomenon cries out for an explanation. Is the diversity of 
models a good or a bad thing? Should it be eliminated or maintained? And for 
what methodological, epistemic, or pragmatic reasons?  
Pluralism implies diversity, but diversity does not necessarily imply 
pluralism. The accounts viewing different heuristics as contrary or contradictory 
perspectives (Levins 1998, 2006; Winther 2006) seem to imply that there is no 
model pluralism, but a diversity of incompatible models for a common 
phenomenon. If holism and reductionism are contradictory, there is no pluralism. 
This is because the truth of holism implies that reductionism is false about their 
common phenomenon and vice versa. Similarly, if holism and reductionism are 
contrary, there is no pluralism, because the two do not share a phenomenon of 
which both can be at least partially true. Thus, whether model diversity in ecology 
implies model pluralism – and whether it is a vice or virtue – remains an 
unresolved issue.10 
In this section, I argue that model diversity implies beneficial model 
pluralism. Different methodological functions, strengths, and limitations in using 
sufficient parameters and aggregative parameters were discussed in previous 
sections. Here, I present an epistemic defense of model pluralism by arguing for 
the explanatory complementarity of reductionism and holism as heuristics. 
Different models utilizing different heuristics have different epistemic strengths 
and limitations and they provide incomplete but complementary research 
perspectives of cognitively limited beings.  
Let me make a distinction between two kinds of causal explanations, simple 
causal claims and mechanistic explanations (Raerinne 2011). A simple causal 
claim describes a causal relationship between the phenomenon-to-be-explained 
and the thing that does the explaining. It refers to a causal explanation in which 
one has a causal relationship between variables, but no or little account – or 
mechanistic explanation – as to why or how the relationship holds between the 
variables. A simple causal claim is thus a manipulable black box relation holding 
between variables.  
Describing a mechanism of a phenomenon is not contrary to describing 
what the causal relationship of a simple causal claim of that phenomenon is. 
Instead, a mechanistic explanation is a complement to a simple causal claim, since 
                                                          
10 A trivial argument for the diversity of models exists. A similar argument is utilized by many 
who confuse diversity with pluralism (e.g. Beatty 1995, 65-75 and Jamniczky 2005). If different 
models applied to the same general phenomenon, but to different systems, so that holistic models 
are used to investigate complex systems of a phenomenon, whereas reductionistic models are used 
to investigate simpler systems of this phenomenon (or vice versa), this would account for the 
diversity of models. At the same time, this would not justify pluralism, since there is no pluralism 
about models that do not share a target. Instead of pluralism, there would be a diversity of local 
monisms. Alternatively, one could call this case global pluralism in the sense that at the discipline 
or science level different heuristics are needed to account for the whole diversity of its target 
systems. Instead of applying this argument, I try to provide arguments in support of epistemic and 
methodological pluralism in theoretical ecology, which does not just establish model diversity, but 
instead the local pluralism of holistic and reductionistic models. 
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it describes how the causal relationship produces its phenomenon-to-be-explained. 
A mechanistic explanation describes the underlying mechanism within the system 
by showing how the system is constituted and how this produces the 
phenomenon-to-be-explained. The suggestion is to view traditional holistic 
ecological models, such as the Lotka-Volterra competition and predation models 
utilizing abstract resources or competition coefficients and Levins’ (1966) 
environmental uncertainty model as providing simple causal claims, whereas 
reductionistic models provide us with mechanistic explanations of the former.  
Holistic and mechanistic models are not exclusive explanatory rivals in the 
sense that when one is true, then the other must be false.  Rather than being 
contrary or contradictory, they can be viewed as complementary explanations.  
Traditional holistic models investigate what would happen to community- or 
population-dependent variables if community or population independent variables 
were manipulated. These are simple causal claims in the sense that we investigate 
what would happen to a system if some of its higher-level variables were 
manipulated without worrying about what is the specific population or individual 
level causes(s) or mechanism(s) behind the change in the system. Mechanistic 
models investigate how this same change happens by accounting for the change in 
dependent variables in terms of lower-level – population- or individual-level – 
independent variables (Tilman 1977, 1980, 1990; Schoener 1986; Grimm 1999). 
Mechanistic models investigate what is the specific mechanism responsible for 
this or that change in variables in which community models are derived from 
population models and population models from individual-based models.  
When one has a mechanistic account of how and why a higher-level simple 
causal relationship holds, this does not show that the higher-level relationship 
becomes non-explanatory or redundant. In fact, both holistic and mechanistic 
models have become more reliable in the sense that we have a holistic model with 
simple causal claims which is convergent with a possible modeled mechanism at a 
lower level. Sometimes the models provide non-convergent results with regard to 
certain parameter or variables values. It is not a priori correct to blame holistic 
models for the failure. In fact, the specific simplifying assumptions about the 
mechanism, such as the aggregative assumptions used, and even the core 
assumptions concerning the mechanism might be incorrect. In the case of non-
convergent results, it may be the case that holistic and mechanistic models need to 
be modified, simplifying assumptions need to relaxed, the results of models need 
to be restricted to certain parameter or variable values, systems, and so on.  
The usual reply is that mechanistic models give better or deeper 
explanations than holistic models of the same phenomenon which are based on 
simple causal claims.11 The explanatory power of an explanation is not, however, 
a one-dimensional attribute. Ylikoski and  Kuorikoski (2010) have distinguished 
between five different dimensions of explanatory power of an explanation: non-
sensitivity (stability of an explanatory relationship with regard to changes in 
background conditions), precision (how well the explanation characterizes the 
                                                          
11 An anonymous referee asked exactly whose reply this is.  However, the relevant question is 
where and when the claim is true.  Compare the specific predictions and explanations given by 
individual-based mechanistic rabies models (Jeltsch et al. 1997; Thulke et al. 1999) to classical 
holistic reaction-diffusion rabies models (Murray et al. 1986). Individual-based rabies models give 
more exact, accurate, and testable predictions and better explanations of rabies epizootics than 
classical holistic models.  In this context, the authors thus have a justification to claim that 
mechanistic models give better explanations than holistic reaction-diffusion models.  
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object of explanation), factual accuracy (lack or innocence of simplifying 
assumptions used in explanations), unification, and cognitive salience 
(ergonomics of explanation – how easily the explanation can be followed and 
understood by limited  cognitive beings). There are trade-offs between the 
different dimensions of explanatory power. More importantly, holist and 
mechanistic models have different strengths and limitations with regard to 
different dimensions of explanatory power.  
Mechanistic models usually give more precise explanations than holistic 
ones, because they include details of causal components and mechanisms rather 
than sufficient parameters (see discussion of resources in section 2 and footnote 
11). Increased precision and complexity in models usually comes at the cost of 
decreased analytical or mathematical tractability. Moreover, complex models are 
more difficult to understand than simpler models, thus, their cognitive salience is 
typically diminished. An explanation characterized too precisely can make it too 
complex for us to understand it (cf. Putnam 1975; Nathan 2012; Raerinne and 
Baedke 2015; Raerinne forthcoming). In other words, precision reduces cognitive 
salience. This is a crucial problem for sciences dealing with complex phenomena, 
such as ecology.    
Holistic models are more unified than mechanistic models. In a holistic 
model with a sufficient parameter, knowing the actual cause or mechanism could 
be irrelevant because the causal relationship holds regardless of which of the 
cause(s) or mechanism(s) were operative. They are also more cognitively salient, 
because they are less precise and include sufficient parameters. In general, there is 
a trade-off between cognitive salience and precision as dimensions of explanatory 
power.  
Holistic models are often more stable or less sensitive than mechanistic 
models in the sense that they utilize higher-level causal proxies or sufficient 
parameters and omit mechanistic details. If a cause does not operate when certain 
background conditions are in place, or if it does not operate in a certain 
system/taxon, then another alternative or back-up cause with similar effects might 
be operative and the model applies to the situation (see environmental uncertainty 
in section 2). Thus, an explanation utilizing sufficient parameters can be claimed 
to be a stable or an insensitive one.   
The proponents of mechanistic models sometimes claim that their models 
include fewer, better, or less factually inaccurate simplifying assumptions than 
holistic models. Both holistic and mechanistic models include simplifying 
assumptions. At the same time, the simplifying assumptions are of different kind, 
and there is probably no general metric to evaluate different kinds of simplifying 
assumptions associated with different heuristics as to how good, reliable, or 
innocent they are. Sufficient and aggregative parameters as abstractions have 
different methodological functions, strengths, and sources of errors. Neither is in 
any straightforward sense less innocent or better than another as a simplifying 
assumption. Thus, insofar as factual accuracy is concerned, it seems to be a 
comparable attribute of explanations within a heuristic, not between heuristics.  
Thus, holistic and mechanistic models are not contrary as explanations. If 
they provide us with convergent results, then they can be viewed as 
complementary. Moreover, given the many and some conflicting dimensions of 
explanatory depth or power, it is not self-evident that mechanistic models provide 
us with better explanations than holistic models. Reductionists and holists focus 
on the same phenomenon, of which both can be true as explanations. But they 
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prefer different dimensions of explanatory power: reductionists want their 
explanations to be precise and system specific, whereas holists favor explanations 
that are unified, cognitive salient, and non-sensitive.  
Several authors have previously discussed different dimensions of 
explanatory power (cf. Fodor 1974; Putnam 1975; Kitcher 1984; Weslake 2010; 
Haug 2011). In contrast to the account of explanatory power presented above, 
these accounts are one-dimensional, for instance, referring to the greater 
generality of higher-level explanantia or mechanistic details of lower-level 
explanantia as the dimension conferring the explanantia with a high explanatory 
power.  The multi-dimensional account of explanatory power not only can 
accommodate the idea of the one -dimensional accounts via, for instance, 
unification or precision, but the one-dimensional accounts lack the flexibility and 
diversity of the multi-dimensional account.  Finally, the multi-dimensional 
account is biased neither towards reductionism nor holism, as the one-dimensional 
accounts are, but can be used to analyze explanatory strengths and limitations of 
both kinds of explanations. Thus, the multi-dimensional account of explanatory 
power is more comprehensive than and superior to the one-dimensional accounts. 
In addition to the above epistemic argument for the complementarity of 
heuristics, a methodological argument for their complementarity exists. This 
applies even if mechanistic and holistic models were not true of a common 
phenomenon as explanations. Holism and reductionism are research perspectives 
on nature having their distinctive methodological strengths and limitations, which 
can be revised, criticized, and corrected. And we often need another heuristic to 
see and correct for the limitations of our heuristic, as the case of a mechanistic 
taxonomy of resources illustrates.  
Tilman’s (1980, 1986) de-abstraction of resources (discussed in section 2) in 
part helped to spell out more accurately under what conditions resources can or 
cannot be successfully treated as a holistic sufficient parameter. Note that this is 
not a case of a victory for reductionism. Rather, it is a case where the perspective 
of one heuristic was needed to better the perspective of another. It is not only that 
resources cannot always be treated as a holistic abstraction, because in some 
research contexts the causal details of different resources matter. In fact, and 
contrary to the holistic abstraction of resources, it is not even true that all the 
resources have a positive, let alone similar, effects on the growth rates of 
populations, since some resources are capable of having negative effects on the 
growth rates of populations, as was discussed in section 3. Thus, a reductionistic 
heuristic helped to see and overcome the limitations of holistic models utilizing 
abstract resources. However, it is not true that systems in general can be treated as 
mere aggregates of their components’ properties in isolation, as the case of 
predation in section 3 demonstrated. Rather, reductionists need to adopt a more 
holistic perspective in modeling systems, since the organization of systems matter 
and cannot always be abstracted away. Finally, even the mechanistic taxonomy of 
resources by Tilman (1980, 1986) is not strictly speaking reductionistic, since it 
includes emergent, holistic elements, such as complementary and antagonistic 
resources. To provide a comprehensive and utilizable mechanistic taxonomy of 
resources, one thus needs to adopt a more holistic perspective in overcoming the 
limitations of applying a strict reductionistic heuristic to this case.  
Levins (1966) argued for using a family of different models when studying 
a common phenomenon, where the models differ in generality, precision, and 
realism. In this section, I have defended the idea of model pluralism in ecology in 
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explanatory and methodological terms. In fact, as I argued above, Levins’ (1998, 
2006) ideas concerning heuristics cannot be used to argue for model pluralism, 





I have argued that holism and reductionism as heuristics and their associated 
abstractions have distinctive methodological and epistemic strengths and 
limitations. Rather than arguing that different research perspectives are 
incompatible, we should view them as complementary – epistemically and 
methodologically. This is easy if heuristics provide us with convergent results. 
But when they produce non-convergent results, we should remember that all 
heuristics have limitations. They are research perspectives that can be corrected, 
revised, and criticized, and we often need another perspective to see the limitation 
of our own perspective.  
We should aim at an ecological theory that is pluralistic in methods and 
explanations. In principle, I have nothing against the possibility of having a 
synthesis of different perspectives, revealing the true or correct nature of nature 
(sensu Levins 1998, 2006 and Winther 2006), even though I have disagreed that 
the perspectives are always or typically contrary or contradictory. Whether such a 
synthesis is forthcoming and whether its development and understanding is 
possible for cognitively limited beings, such as us, is beyond the scope of this 
paper. But insofar as part of the job of philosophy of science is to help scientists 
in their current methodological, epistemic, and evidential matters, we cannot wait 
for such a synthesis to occur. Instead, we have work with and accept more limited 
heuristics. Though heuristics have their limitations, we can effectively use them if 
we are aware of these limitations.   
I do not suggest that the presented taxonomy of abstractions is exhaustive. 
Levy and Bechtel (2013), for instance, discuss a putative distinct variety of 
abstraction – causal connectivity – which they argue is compatible with 
mechanistic explanations.12 Rather, the aim was to provide a starting point for 
building a more comprehensive functional taxonomy of abstractions and to 
discuss the implications this has, for instance, for the debate whether – and/or to 
what extent – mechanistic accounts of explanation are compatible with the use of 
abstraction, that is, whether mechanistic accounts are committed to the thesis that 
de-abstracting or adding more details to an explanation always or typically makes 
the explanation better. 
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12 It is debatable whether Levy and Bechtel (2013) has a pure case of an abstraction in mind. Their 
causal connectivity seems to be a hybrid case of an abstraction combining both aggregative and 
sufficient parameters, since it omits details of both causes with similar effects and the causal 
organization of a system. This is, however, a topic for another paper. There is nothing wrong with 
hybrid abstractions. Different target systems may require different kinds and degrees of 
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